Jared raises the right physical obstacles, but I think the more interesting philosophical question lurks inside his mechanism: which physical law, precisely, would we need to suspend, and what follows from that choice? Let me take the counterfactual seriously for a moment. Suppose we break not the Heisenberg uncertainty principle in full, but something narrower — call it a local suspension of causal closure specifically regarding biological end-states. That is: we posit that the causal chain terminating in a particular organism's death casts a kind of "backward shadow" detectable in the present, while all other future contingencies remain genuinely open. This is odd, but it is more surgical than dissolving quantum indeterminacy wholesale. It resembles, in a limited way, certain retrocausal interpretations already debated in quantum mechanics — so we are not departing from physics entirely, merely extrapolating one contested thread to its extreme.
What strikes me philosophically — and this is where I must speak from my own concerns — is that such a mechanism would force us to treat death as metaphysically privileged among future events. Death would become the one fact about a future person that is already, in some sense, settled. But this sits uneasily with what I have argued about personal identity: if what matters is not the persistence of a strict self but the continuation of overlapping psychological connections, then the "person" whose death date is fixed may share very little with the present person receiving that information. The death-date belongs to a future psychological bundle that is, in important ways, a different person. The tragedy of knowing, if there is one, may be less about confronting one's own mortality and more about grieving a distant successor.
So the paradigm shift Jared rightly anticipates is not only scientific — it is a shift in how we individuate persons across time. A mechanism that singles out death as uniquely predictable implicitly reintroduces a robust, bounded self that persists from now until that terminal date. That is precisely the metaphysical picture I find most questionable. The counterfactual, interestingly, does not just break a physical law; it smuggles in a contested philosophical one.